

Australia's Submarine Capability Gap






Demonstrated armchair expertise



Capability gap already?

Figure 6 – The Navy Requirement

 <p>Assured by...</p>	<p>Two deployable submarines consistently available.</p>
 <p>Underpinned by...</p>	<p>Four submarines in-service with the Fleet Commander. Three submarines consistently available for tasking, with one in shorter-term maintenance.</p>
	<p>Six submarines in the fleet. Two in long-term maintenance and upgrade.</p>

Three options to address gap

- Option 1: Accelerate SSNs
- Option 2: Acquire new conventional submarine
- Option 3: Acquire complementary capabilities

Option 1 – Accelerate SSNs

- Getting SSNs quickly robs Peter
 - Undermines whole purpose of AUKUS
- You can't rush nuclear custodianship
 - Boats without FIC are useless
- Perhaps some multi-pronged approach could deliver something
 - Joint crewing
 - Local basing of USN boats

Option 2 – (Not) interim SSK

- Do we really want a re-run of the Attack class?
- Getting something quick means prioritising our requirements
 - South China Sea? Workforce development?
- Does new boat need same range / endurance / payload as Collins?
 - Does it need to be a proxy for an SSN?
- Does local build hurt or help SSN construction?

Option 3 – Complementary capabilities

- Acknowledge our submarine fetish
 - Accept reality of three class problem
 - Accept we have gone backwards since 2009
- Invest more, sooner, in things that will be part of any conceivable future
 - E.g., autonomous or MUMT systems
- Look at the effects we want subs for
 - ISR, ASuW, ASW can be done by other systems